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Money, Banking and Dynamics: 
Two Wicksellian routes from Mises to Hayek and Schumpeter 
By AGNÈS FESTRÉ*  
ABSTRACT. This paper examines and compares, in both historical and theoretical perspectives, 
Hayek and Schumpeter’s account of the role played by banks and credit in their respective 
explanations of business cycles. The first section is focused on the common inheritance of 
these two authors, which can be traced back to Wicksell, going from Mises whose Theory of 
Money and Credit provides, as we shall see, a crucial link in this perspective.  
The two following sections deal with Hayek and Schumpeter’s respective accounts as well as 
critical reconstruction of this tradition. A close examination of their respective treatments of 
the banking system and its effects on economic productive structures then allows to see in a 
new light the theoretical question of the impact of credit on economic dynamics and its related 
policy proposals in a different light. 
The last section is dedicated to a comparison between Hayek and Schumpeter’s views of the 
dynamics of monetary economies and their corresponding policy issues. 
 
 
 
I 
Introduction 
 
 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER AND FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, although a generation apart, belong to 
different sides of the same Austrian tradition. The one side –that of Ludwig von Mises and 
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Hayek– led to the Modern Austrian School, whereas Schumpeter built his proper version of 
Austrian economics without generating, strictly speaking, a school of thought. Their 
respective contributions to economic analysis have given rise to a considerable synthetic and 
critical literature, including useful work on comparative grounds by historians of economic 
thoughti. However, these authors did not investigate thoroughly the relations between Hayek’s 
and Schumpeter’s theories of banking and business cycles. According to us, this issue is 
worth investigating for two reasons at least.  
 From a historical point of view, comparing Hayek and Schumpeter’s approaches as applied 
to the question of the dynamic interference between bank-credit and productive dynamics 
illustrates the well-known influence of Wicksell upon the development of Austrian theories of 
business cycles. In this connection, Mises’ Theory of Money and Credit and, in particular, his 
criticism of Wicksell provide a crucial linkii for interpreting the relations between Swedish 
and Austrian traditions of economic analysis and one of the aim of the paper is to emphasize 
the analytical ‘Mises bridge’ between Wicksell and both Hayek and Schumpeter.  
 Moreover, from a theoretical angle, this investigation raises a fundamental question which 
is still at stakes within today’s debates among macroeconomists, namely, the issue of the 
influence of credit pertaining to dynamic economic processes. If both Hayek and Schumpeter 
took as a same starting-point of their business cycle approaches the Wicksellian original 
intuition of the possible interference by banks with the market for capital, they however 
provided two radically opposed as regard to the impact of credit on the dynamics of 
production. From this standpoint also, the re-reading of Mises’ Theory of Money and Credit 
brings into light some of the theoretical underlying assumptions as regard to the working of 
the banking system that may help to understand why Schumpeter and Hayek reached so 
divergent conclusions. 
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 The structure of the paper is the following. The first section is focused on the common 
inheritance of these two authors, which can be traced back to Wicksell, going from Mises 
whose Theory of Money and Credit provides, as we shall see, a crucial link in this 
perspective.  
The two following sections deal with Hayek and Schumpeter’s resepctive account as well as 
critical reconstruction of this tradition. A close examination of their respective treatment of 
the banking system and its effects on economic productive structures then permits to see the 
theoretical question of the impact of credit on economic dynamics and its related policy 
proposals in a different light. 
A last section is therefore dedicated to a comparison between Hayek and Schumpeter’s views 
of the dynamics of monetary economies and their corresponding policy issues. 
 
 
 
II 
The Wicksell-Mises connection 
 
 IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SO-CALLED ‘MARGINAL REVOLUTION’ of the last end of the 
XIXth, economic analysis splits into two branches. The first one is made up of economists 
who take as the methodological starting-point of their analyses the static or stationary state of 
a barter economy and consider that this basic framework is likely to be extended in order to 
account for monetary and financial considerations as well as dynamics. However, in such a 
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setting, the introduction of money, bank-credit or any factor of growth does not substantially 
alter the features that are associated with the rudimentary economy of static real exchange. 
 This tradition is to be distinguished from a second one which one can trace back to 
Wicksell. It is now commonplace to refer to this author as the forerunner of the Austrian 
tradition of business cycles starting with von Mises and culminating in Hayek’s trade cycle 
theories. Though less widely recognized, and as we shall develop, Schumpeter’s contribution 
to business cycle analysis can also be seen in line with Wicksell’s approachiii. 
In contrast to the orthodox monetary view, these authors consider that the introduction of the 
organization of bank credit in the field of economic theory implies radical changes within the 
economic system. Indeed, as soon as one accounts for the existence of a banking system, 
money ceases to be exogenous and the mere counterpart of real exchanges. The ex novo and 
endogenous nature of credit-money modifies the conditions under which the mechanisms of 
co-ordination between savings and investment operate. In other terms, while in a barter 
economy these two magnitudes are defined in real terms, in a monetary one, credit money 
can, to a certain extent, become a substitute for real savings. Thus, by altering co-ordination 
between savings and investment, the organization of the banking system may allow the 
emergence of global disequilibria.  
Historically, the first attempt to deal in analytical terms with this issue was provided by 
Wicksell. In particular, this author put much emphasis on the dynamic processes that 
characterize the co-movements of savings and investment and analyzed the conditions under 
which an equilibrium could be established. As well-known, the ‘working hypothesis’ at the 
core of Wicksell’s argument lies in the well-know distinction between the money rate of 
interest, which is pegged down as given in his analysis since it is assumed to be fixed by the 
banking system quite irrespectively of real productivity conditions, and the natural (or 
normal) rate of interest, which Wicksell defines as follows:  
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 The rate of interest at which the demand for loan capital and the supply of savings exactly agree, and 
which more or less corresponds to the expected yields on the newly created real capital will then be the 
normal or natural rate. It is essentially variable. If the prospects of employment of capital become more 
promising, demand will increase and will at first exceed supply; interest rates will then rise as the demand 
from entrepreneurs contracts until a new equilibrium is reached at a slightly higher rate of interest. At the 
same time equilibrium must ipso facto obtain (...) in the market for goods and services, so that wages and 
prices remain unchanged. The sum of money income will then usually exceed the money value of 
consumption goods annually produced, but the excess of income -i.e., what is annually saved and invested in 
production- will not produce any demand for present goods but only for labor and future production 
(Wicksell, 1967, pp. 192-193). 
 
 
In other terms, the level of the natural rate of interest corresponds to the one that would be 
determined by supply and demand of capital if the latter was lent without the mediation of the 
banking system. In contrast to the money rate of interest, the natural rate of interest is very 
likely to fluctuate in accordance with new investment opportunities. Under these 
circumstances, Wicksell’s cumulative process is naturally triggered by a variation in the real 
rate of interest. 
 
 
Mises adopts a similar distinction, though he finds Wicksell’s analysis of the interaction of 
the money and natural rates inadequate. In his Theory of Money and Credit, he indeed writes:  
 
 According to [Wicksell’s] argument, the objective exchange value of money is not determined at all by 
the processes of the market in which money and the other economic goods are exchanged. If the money 
price of a single commodity or group of commodities is wrongly assessed in the market, then the resulting 
maladjustment of the supply and demand and the production and consumption of this commodity or group 
of commodities will sooner or later bring about the necessary correction. If, on the other hand, all 
commodity prices, or the average price level, should for any reason be raised or lowered, there is no factor in 
the circumstances of the commodity market that could bring about a reaction. Consequently, if there is to be 
any reaction at all against a price assessment that is either too high or too low it must in some way or other 
originate outside the commodity market. In the further course of his argument, Wicksell arrives at the 
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conclusion that the regulator of money prices is to be sought in the relations of the commodity market to the 
money market, in the broadest sense of the term. The cause which influences the demand for raw materials, 
labor and other means of production, and thus indirectly determines the upward or downward movement of 
commodity prices, is the ratio between the money rate of interest (...) and the ‘natural’ or equilibrium rate of 
interest (...) In fact, all that [Wicksell] attempts to prove is that forces operate from the loan market on the 
commodity market which prevent the objective exchange value of money from rising too high or falling too 
low. He never asserts that the rate of interest on loans determines the actual level of this value in any way 
(...) (Mises, 1980, p. 140). 
 
 
By this statement, we are to understand that, in contrast to Wicksell, Mises provides a theory 
of the determination of the ‘objective exchange value of money’iv, whereby the level of the 
rate of interest on loans is not to be considered as different in natura from the ratio between 
money and other economic goods. Indeed, the interest on loans or the monetary rate of 
interest is identical to “the interest on capital” since “for Mises (...) there is no fixed capital 
and no explicit account is given of the bond market” and therefore “the capital market is 
included, and confused with the money market” (Bellofiore, 1998, p. 542. From here, 
following Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of interestv, Mises asserts that the variations in the ratio of 
exchange between present goods and goods of higher ordersvi, from which the natural 
phenomenon of interest is derived, are not different phenomena from the variations in the 
objective exchange value of money (Mises, 1980, p. 388).  
More precisely, Mises distinguishes between two kinds of influence on the rate of interest (on 
capital) that may result from an increase of the issue of fiduciary means by banksvii. The first 
one is indirect and permanent. The connection is indirect and permanent because it operates 
through the displacements in the social distribution of income and wealth which occur as a 
consequence of variations in the objective exchange value of moneyviii. But whether the 
increase of the stock of money in the broader sense causes the interest rate (on capital) to fall 
(or to raise) depends on whether the new distribution of income and property is more (or less) 
favorable to the accumulation of capital. In certain circumstances, for instance, when the 
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redistribution of wealth following an increase of fiduciary media leads to increased saving and 
a reduction of the standard of living, i.e., to an increase in the national subsistence fund, it is 
possible for even the natural rate of interest to diminishix.  
The second kind of influence is directly related to the business of bankingx. More exactly, 
when issuing new fiduciary media, commercial banks cause the interest rate on capital to fall. 
Let us quote Mises on this point: 
 
 The new fiduciary media coming on the loan market have also a direct effect on the rate of interest. They 
are an additional supply of present goods and consequently they tend to cause the rate of interest to fall 
(Ibid., p. 391). 
 
 
Mises then draws the reader’s attention on the connection between the indirect effect 
following the displacements in the social distribution of income and property and the direct 
effect resulting from the issue of new fiduciary media. Although he recognises that both the 
direction and the intensity of the indirect effect are not easy to determine, he nevertheless 
assumes that “the increase in the supply of fiduciary media in the market in which present 
goods are exchanged for future goods at first exerts a stronger influence than the displacement 
of the social distribution which occurs as a consequence of it” (Mises, 1980, p. 391). 
 
  
 Let us now consider how Mises defines the natural rate of interest. As already mentioned, 
Mises’ distinctive contribution as compared to Wicksell has been to shed light on the link 
between both the monetary and the natural rate and the objective exchange value of money. 
Nevertheless, on the subject of the natural rate of interest, Mises’ allegiance to Böhm-Bawerk 
is manifest. Mises indeed defines the level of the natural rate of interest as: 
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 [T]he level of productivity of that lengthening of the period of production which is just justifiable 
economically and of that additional lengthening of the period of production which is just not justifiable; for 
the interest on the unit of capital upon whose aid the lengthening depends must always amount to less than 
the marginal return of the justifiable lengthening. The period of production which is thus defined must be of 
such a length that exactly the whole available subsistence fund is necessary on the one hand and sufficient 
on the other for paying the wages of the laborers throughout the duration of the productive process” (Mises, 
1980, p. 399). 
 
 
From here Mises builds his critical re-construction of Wicksell’s analysis of the dynamics 
between the rate of interest on loan and the natural rate of interest.  
As for the impulse, and in contrast to Wicksell for whom the cumulative movement start with  
a spontaneous lowering of the real rate of interest, Mises assumes that the banks have the 
power, by issuing new fiduciary media, to lower the rate of interest below its natural level, the 
latter being defined accordingly with Böhm-Bawerk’s representation of the average period of 
production.  
This reduction of the interest on loans enables and obliges entrepreneurs to enter upon longer 
processes of productionxi. Indeed, assuming decreasing returns on capital, the additional funds 
provided by banks are invested in longer roundabout processes of production as long as they 
still pay the entrepreneurs. Thus, the decrease of the rate of interest on capital is necessarily 
followed by a lengthening of the average period of production. However, this lengthening of 
the average period of production is only practicable when the means of subsistence have 
increased sufficiently to support the workers and entrepreneurs during the whole period of 
production. If this is not the case, then, the trend towards increased productive activity will 
prove to be unsustainable. Mises writes that “a time must necessarily come when the means of 
subsistence available for consumption are all used up although the capital goods employed in 
production have not yet been transformed into consumption goods” (Mises, 1980, p. 400). 
Indeed, assuming as a starting-point a situation of general stationary equilibrium where all 
factors of production are already fully employedxii, the implementation of more roundabout 
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processes of production will cause the price of production goods (including labor) to rise 
since there has been no increase of intermediate products. However, Mises suppose that the 
pressure on production goods is greater than that on consumption goods, since the prices of 
the latter, although they rises, do it in a moderate degree, namely, “only insofar as they are 
raised by the rise in wages”xiii (Mises (1980), p. 401). Therefore, it turns out that the tendency 
toward a fall in the rate of interest on loans that originates in the policy of banks is at first 
strengthened. But at a certain point, a counter-movement will set in, i.e., the prices of 
consumption goods will rise while those of production goods will fall. In other terms, the rate 
of interest on capital will rise, thus approaching the natural rate” (Mises, 1980, p. 401). Mises’ 
explanation runs as follows. The implementation of more roundabout processes of production 
implies the transfer of intermediate goods as well as labor from their previous employment in 
shorter processes of production, i.e., those producing consumption goods, which are now 
activated at a reduced scale. Since no change in the consumption needs of the wage earners is 
involvedxiv, the effect of this is an increase in consumption goods’ prices. Furthermore, this 
tendency is now strengthened by the decrease in the objective exchanged value of money 
following the increase of fiduciary media issued by the banking systemxv. Thus, the structure 
of relative prices which is determined by the state of the capital market and has been disturbed 
by the intervention of the banks will be approximately re-establishedxvi. 
What is particularly interesting to focus on at this stage is the fact that the behavior of banks is 
not invoked in Mises’ explanation of the reversal of the cycle, although it is the case 
concerning the impulse.  
On one hand, Mises makes it clear that any action from the banks in order to offset the 
automatic rise in the rate of interest on capital will be uselessxvii. He writes: 
 
At first, the banks may try to oppose these two tendencies [due to the insufficient supply of consumption 
goods and reinforced by the fall in the objective exchange value of money] by continually reducing the 
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interest rate on loans and forcing fresh quantities of fiduciary media into circulation. But the more they thus 
increase the stock of money in the broader sense, the more quickly does the value of money fall, and the 
stronger is its countereffect on the rate of interest (Mises, 1980, p. 402).  
 
 
On the other hand, the reversal of cycle is not to be attributed to the deliberate increase of the 
interest rate on loans by banks as it is the case in Wicksell’s explanation. On this subject, it is 
worth reminding Mises’ critical argumentation against the latter’s account of the end of the 
inflationary cumulative process. In his Theory of Money and Credit, Mises indeed points out 
some inconsistencies in Wicksell’s claim according to which a general increase in commodity 
prices would induce the banks to raise their rates of interest. One of the contradiction lies in 
the fact that, though assuming as a starting-point that only fiduciary media are in circulation 
and that the quantity of them is not legislatively restricted, Wicksell then have recourse to 
arguments as regard to the requirements of business for gold coins and banknotes (their 
demand increasing as the price level rises) in order to show that the banks must raise the rate 
of interest on loans. A second contradiction is related to another limit to the circulation of 
fiduciary media mentioned by Wicksell, i.e., the limit set by the employment of the precious 
metals for industrial purposes. Here again, such a mechanism, which may be effective in the 
case of commodity moneyxviii is not relevant in a ‘pure credit economy’.  
 
To sum up, Mises’ critical re-construction of Wicksell’s analysis of the influence of credit on 
the dynamics of prices and its consequences on real production can be interpreted as follows: 
1. By having clarified the various influences in time of a modification of the quantity of 
fiduciary media on the movement of relative prices as well as the force that pushes the two 
rates into equilibrium, Mises avoided the inconsistencies of the Wicksellian framework and 
paved the way for the development of various explanations of business cycles.  
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More precisely, Mises explained that the issue of fiduciary media by banks, which comes to 
the same as the net credit creation associated with an abnormally low loan rate (relatively to 
the natural rate) in Wicksell’s treatment, increases the supply of money in the broader sense 
and is consequently able to influence the objective exchange value of money. 
Then, variations of the value of money evokes a redistribution of real income and wealth, on 
the one hand, because people are apt to overlook the variability of the exchange value of 
money and, on the other hand, because variations in the value of money do not affect all 
economic goods uniformly and simultaneously. Indeed, the agents who first come to the 
market to buy goods make relatively the largest gains in a sequence scale the later they 
exercise the declining purchasing power of their money. 
 
2. On the other hand, Mises linked the previous analysis with Böhm-Bawerk’s conception of 
the natural rate of interest in relation to the period of production. This lead him to focus on the 
impact of credit upon the determination of the length of the production period (a point to 
which, as we have seen, Wicksell objected), and hence, on the limit to capital accumulation 
set by consumers’ choices.   
 
3. He also provided an explanation of the upper turning point of the cycle which is consistent 
with the framework of a  ‘pure credit economy’ described by Wicksellxix, without presenting 
however, the flaw in the latter’s argumentation when considering the question of the limit to 
credit creation. 
 
In the following, we shall examine and compare what Hayek and Schumpeter did with this 
‘Wicksell-Mises’ inheritance, more particulary with regard to the three preceding 
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characteristics to which we will refer respectively as: the ‘redistribution effect’, the 
‘lengthening effect’ and the ‘reference to a unconstrained banking system’, everytime needed.  
 
 
 
III 
Hayek’s route 
 
 IT IS NOW COMMONPLACE TO REFER TO HAYEK  as an inheritor of Wicksell.  
On one hand, in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (1929) first translated into English in 
1933, Hayek goes back to the Wicksellian distinction between a barter (or a commodity 
money) economy and a monetary economy and notes the crucial role played by a commodity 
money in ensuring equilibrium between savings and investment. He notes that “in a barter 
economy, interest forms a sufficient regulator for the proportional development of the 
production of capital goods and consumption goods, respectively” (Hayek 1966, pp. 91-2). 
Nevertheless, as Wicksell, he considers that it is possible to conceive of the special case of a 
monetary economy in which there would be no tendency to disequilibrium. More specifically, 
the introduction of a supply of money- that is, the transition to a monetary economy - has no 
impact on the tendency towards stability so long as it is backed by an equivalent amount of 
accumulated savings (Ibid., p. 92).  
 
On the other hand, Hayek’s position with respect to interest also grew out of the work of 
Wicksell. As well-known, in his two major contribution to business cycles, i.e. Monetary 
Theory and the Trade Cycle and Prices and Production (1931), he distinguishes between two 
rates, the monetary rate of interest on one side, and the equilibrium rate on the otherxx. When 
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re-constructing Wicksell’s argument, he writes that if there was no money, the ‘natural’ rate 
of interest, which he prefers to call the ‘equilibrium’ rate of interest, would be such as to make 
the in natural demand for capital, i.e., investment, coincide with the in natura supply of 
capital, i.e., savings. By contrast, in a money economy the monetary rate may differ from the 
equilibrium one, because demand and supply do not meet in their ‘natural’ form, but in the 
form of money, “the quantity of which available for capital purposes may be arbitrarily 
changed by the banks” (Hayek, 1935, p. 23). Thus, the possible divergence between the two 
rates is due to the existence of a banking system which may interfere with the working of the 
capital market, i.e. the loanable funds market, since, by granting credit to entrepreneurs, banks 
can create new means of payment that circulate within the economy. Therefore, and provided 
all banks are induced to take concerted action with one another, the banking system as a 
whole can modify the conditions under which saving and investment adjust each other. In 
other terms, disequilibria only become a possibility when the organisation of credit disturbs 
the adjustment process towards equilibrium between supply and demand.  
However, Hayek disagrees with Wicksell’s definition of ‘neutral money’, which amounts to 
admit that the natural rate of interest ensure both the stability of prices and equilibrium 
between the demand for and the supply of capital. In Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, 
he writes:  
 
The monetary starting point makes it possible, in fact, to show deductively the inevitability of fluctuations 
under the existing monetary system and, indeed, under almost any other which can be imagined. It will be 
shown, in particular, that the Wicksell-Mises theory of the effects of a divergence between the ‘natural’ and 
the money rate of interest already contains the most important elements of an explanation, and has only to be 
freed from any direct reference to a purely imaginary ‘general money value’ (...) in order to form the basis of 
a Trade Cycle theory sufficing for a deductive explanation of all elements in the Trade Cycle (Hayek 1966, 
p. 147). 
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As is evident from this statement, Hayek adheres with Mises’ analysis by claiming that a 
change in the volume of money affects not only the aggregate price level but also 
systematically cause variations in the exchange ratio between consumption goods and 
production goodsxxi. Thus, a change in the total quantity of money in circulation implies the 
formation of prices or rates of interest which differ from those one would find associated with 
a barter economy equilibrium. For Hayek, the new intertemporal price structure following a 
change in the volume of money due to the influence of banks conveys wrong information 
which “elicit movements which not only do not lead to a new equilibrium position but which 
actually create new disturbances of equilibrium” (Hayek, 1966, p. 94). 
Therefore, the ‘equilibrium’ rate of interest is conceived as that particular level of the interest 
rate which corresponds to the ‘right’ prices. Taking Böhm-Bawerk’s definition of the ‘average 
production period’ as granted, Hayek assumes that the equilibrium rate of interest reflects 
time preferences of agents. If the latter are modified in such a way that individuals make the 
decision to forgo present for future consumption, i.e., to save more, the average period is 
lengthened to such an extent that the increased amount of capital can remain invested until the 
output of the single consumption good is obtained. 
Let us now remind Hayek’s explanation of the cycle as betrayed in Monetary Theory and the 
Trade Cycle as well as in Prices and Production.  
As already indicated, for Hayek, the origin of the cycle lies in a divergence between the 
money rate of interest and the ‘equilibrium’ one. Whether the initial disequilibrium is caused 
by a monetary or a real change is of no significance for Hayek since, according to him, all the 
problem lies in the inability of the banking system to ensure, at every point in time, the 
coincidence of the level of the monetary rate with the natural one. Various circumstances 
causing a divergence between the two rates are indeed envisaged by Hayek in Monetary 
Theory of the Trade Cycle. For instance, he refers to “changes in the relations of costs and 
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selling prices” (Hayek, 1966, p. 129) or to “shifts in the distribution of incomes” (Ibid.) which 
he considers as phenomena resulting indirectly from  “monetary influences” (Hayek, 1966, 
p. 128). Indeed, Hayek consents that the level of the rate of interest on loans need not to be 
lowered by deliberate intervention from the monetary authorities. As he indicates:  
 
 The same effect can be obviously produced by an improvement in the expectations of profit or by a 
diminution in the rate of saving, which may drive the ‘natural rate’ (at which the demand for and the supply 
of savings are equal) above its previous level; while the banks refrain from raising their rate of interest to a 
proportionate extent, but continue to lend at the previous rate, and thus enable a greater demand for loans to 
be satisfied than would be possible by the exclusive use of the available supply of ‘savings’ (Hayek, 1966, 
p. 147). 
 
As can be shown, Hayek’s position on the subject of ‘monetary influences’ is not so clear. In 
Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, he insists on the elasticity of the volume of money as 
an “immanent necessity of the monetary and credit mechanism” (Hayek, 1966, p. 127) and 
gives the reader the impression that the endogenous nature of the mechanisms of credit 
creation by the banking system provides a necessary and sufficient condition for business 
cycles, whether it is associated with the arbitrary interference of authorities or not (Ibid. 
p. 140).  
By contrast, in Prices and Production, the focus of Hayek’s interest has shifted to the 
“successive changes in the real structure of production which constitutes those fluctuations” 
(Hayek, Introduction to the English translation of Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, 
1966, p 17). He now regards the “case of an increase of money in the form of credits granted 
to producers” (Hayek, 1935, p. 54) as the starting point of the analysis and sees in the 
“deliberate” decision-making by the monetary authorities the ultimate cause of the cycle 
(Hayek, 1935, p. 85).  
Finally, in Profit, Interest and Investment, a contribution undoubtedly marked by his ongoing 
debate with Kaldor on Keynesian issues, Hayek minimises the role given to the banks and the 
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organisation of the monetary system (see Kaldor and Hayek, both 1942). Business cycles are 
now caused by a rise in the rate of profit and its effects on income distribution and factors 
substitution, the monetary rate of interest being kept constant.  
Upon closer analysis, Hayek’s hesitancy as regard to the monetary influences on the cycle 
may be attributed to the fact that he did not make sufficiently clear the institutional monetary 
framework he has in mind. His treatment of the interference by banks with the real 
propagation mechanisms in the course of the cycle provides a meaningful example of the lack 
of unity within Hayek’s business cycle analysis as regard to his handling of monetary and 
banking patternsxxii.  
As well-known, the upswing of the cycle is characterized by an increase in the demand for 
capital emanating from producers perceiving new opportunities of investment thanks to bank-
credit. Similarly to Mises, the newly raised capital is allocated to more roundabout processes 
of production. However, since full-employment prevails, the increase of capital goods can 
only be achieved through the withdrawal of productive resources already employed in shorter 
lines of production. Therefore, the growing production of capital goods goes hand in hand 
with a declining output of consumption goods. Assuming some delay in the wage rise, prices 
of capital goods rise at a greater rate than the prices of consumption goods, thus reinforcing 
the movement of expansion. Moreover, there are additional empowering factors linked to the 
‘organization of credit’. Let us consider in more details how Hayek describes the banking 
system. Unlike Mises, Hayek assumes a ‘mix’ monetary economy, involving both an 
exogenous and an endogenous kind of money. The commercial banks make their decisions 
according to their profits expectations, which depend on the risk characteristics of borrowers 
as well as the actions of their respective competitors. Risk-aversion of banks grows as the 
movement of expansion proceeds and is not independent from their pricing policy. Indeed, at 
a given risk-level, the choice not to satisfy demand (by imposing a too high loan rate) implies 
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a greater opportunity cost for the banker. This induces a winner’s course problem, whereby 
banks are incited, so as not to loose their clients and not to encounter additional risk, to grant 
more credit in the rising tide even at the cost of a depletion of their own reserves. From this 
we are to understand that there exist an ‘elastic’ deposit multiplier which is likely to sustain 
growing productive activity. 
However, a time will come where the consumers will face an insufficient supply of 
consumption goods, thus creating a tension on the market which will be worsened with the 
appearance of additional incomes generated by the upswing. Then a countermovement of 
relative prices will occur: the market price of consumption goods will rise while the one of 
capital goods will fall, and the old price ratio will be re-established. However, contrary to 
Mises, Hayek thinks that they are technical limits to the creation of credit, so that it is the 
specific behavior of the banks that determines the upper turning point of the cyclexxiii. In other 
terms, the flexible deposit multiplier described above appears to be bounded. Hayek indeed 
indicates that, when the price of consumer goods begins to rise more quickly than the price of 
consumption goods, the ratio between cash payments and payments by cheque is altered in 
favor of the former. Consequently, in the course of a boom, the need for cash will increase 
along with prices and induce a cash drain that will force banks to restrict credit supply. 
Hayek’s reasoning is as follows: 
 
 Concerted action in this direction, which for competitive reasons is the only action possible, will ensue 
only when the increased cash requirements of business compel the banks to protect their cash balances by 
checking further credit expansion, or when the Central Bank has preceded them. This, again, will only 
happen, as a rule, when the banks have been induced by the growing drain on their cash to increase their re-
discount. Experience shows, moreover, that the relation between cheque-payments and cash payments alters 
in favour of the latter as the boom proceeds, so that an increased proportion of the cash is finally withdrawn 
from the banks (Hayek, 1966, pp. 174-175). 
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In this matter, Hayek follows Wicksell. To a certain extent, his approach could be criticized 
on the same grounds as Mises’ critical argumentation with respect to Wicksell’s treatment of 
the banking system. Indeed, in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, Hayek gives the 
impression to take for granted a commercial banking system whose monetary liabilities enter 
circulation by way of loans to manufacturers and he emphasizes “the potential implicit in this 
institutional fact for the creation of money to interfere with the capital market’s co-ordination 
of saving and investment” (Laidler, 1994, p. 9). However, in Prices and Production, when 
discussing the case of ‘voluntary savings’, he refers to a monetary system consisting in stable 
base money, whereby the confusion between “those deposits which find their origin in credit 
and those which arose through cash payments” (Hayek, 1966, p. 163), which was at the origin 
of the unsustainable cash drain in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, is not allowed for 
anymore. As stressed by Trautwein, this ‘dual’ treatment of the monetary system renders 
Hayek’s distinction between the cases of ‘voluntary savings’ and ‘forced saving’ inconsistent. 
There is indeed no reason to assume that, in the case of ‘forced savings’, banks act as passive 
brokers if we have in mind the same underlying institutional framework as the one prevailing 
in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle. Indeed, if we conceive banks as creators of money 
which are therefore unable to distinguish precisely between deposits originating in credit and 
those coming out cash payments, then an increase of voluntary savings would also imply an 
expansion of bank deposits which would trigger exactly the same kind of destabilizing 
mechanisms as the direct creation of creditxxiv. 
Let us now consider how Schumpeter dealt with the Wicksell-Mises encounter. 
 
 
 
IV 
Schumpeter’s route 
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 In Schumpeter’s writings, references to Wicksell mark his consideration for the work 
accomplished by the Swedish author and his direct followers inside the Stockholm School in 
the field of monetary theoryxxv.  
More specifically, Schumpeter acknowledges that Wicksell has made great progress for the 
development of a monetary analysis fully integrated with the economic theory of value and 
distribution, although he has not reversed the well-established tradition in economic theory 
according to which monetary theory is in a separate compartment and the theory of value and 
distribution in another. Schumpeter demonstrates this by commenting on the concept of 
‘neutral money’ introduced by Wicksell. On this, it is worth quoting Schumpeter at length: 
 
If, on the one hand, the facts of value and distribution are logically so independent of money that they can 
be set forth with only a passing reference to it, but if, on the other hand, it is recognized that money may act 
as a disturber, then the problem arises of defining how money would have to behave in order to leave the 
real processes of the barter model uninfluenced. Wicksell was the first to see the problem clearly and to coin 
the appropriate concept, Neutral Money. In itself, this concept expresses nothing but the established belief in 
the possibility of pure ‘real’ analysis. But it also suggests recognition of the fact that money need not be 
neutral. So its creation induced a hunt for the conditions in which money is neutral. And this point 
eventually led to the discovery that no such conditions can be formulated, that is, that there is no such thing 
as neutral money or money that is a mere veil spread over the phenomena that really matter –an interesting 
case of a concept’s rendering valuable service by proving unworkable (Schumpeter, 1954, pp. 1088-89). 
 
 
Likewise, Schumpeter points out that Wicksell was in rupture with the customary habit 
among theoreticians to treat banking activity as a passive device of intermediation between 
individual lenders and borrowersxxvi.  
Finally, he mentions Wicksell’s well-known distinction between money and real rates of 
interest, indicating that: 
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[T]he Wicksellian emphasis upon the effects of possible divergences between money and real rates of 
interest does not constitute a compelling reason for abandoning the position that the fundamental fact about 
interest is a net return to physical goods, a position from which Wicksell himself never departed. However, it 
does constitute a good and sufficient reason for treating the money rate as a distinct variable in its own right 
that depends, partly at least, upon factors other than those that govern the net return to physical capital 
(natural or real rate). The two are related, of course. In equilibrium they are even equal. But they are no 
longer ‘fundamentally the same thing’” (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1118).  
 
 
Except for his conception of interest, Schumpeter’s allegeance to Wicksell is rather clear. 
First, the Schumpeterian ‘circular flow’ in his Theory of Economic Development simply 
replaces the Wicksellian “pure cash economy” (Wicksell, 1965, pp. 51-58). In the basic 
framework of the circular flow, money is primarily perceived as a special good serving the 
purpose of a unit of account and facilitating the circulation of commodities within the 
economy (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 53). However, metal money is not the only conceivable 
means of payment. Credit - in this case “normal credit” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 100)- also 
plays a part. Together with commodity money, collaterals, or asset-backing requirements it 
serves as a counterpart to real exchanges.  
Second, Schumpeter regards credit creation by banks as the differentia specifica of capitalism. 
In the same vein as Wicksell, he claims that the emergence of a banking system signifies a 
departure from the static case in that it gives rise to a new category of credit to which he refers 
as “abnormal credit” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 102). This form of credit is associated with the 
case of economic development, that is with dynamic analysis, since without it neither 
innovation nor cycles were possible. Thus, the process of economic development creates a 
situation where the nature and role of money is dominated by its bank credit form. The key 
role of credit is the creation of purchasing power for the purpose of transferring it to 
innovators in order for them to finance their new productive activities. If the stationary state is 
confined to the mere transfer of already existing purchasing power, economic development 
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requires the creation of new means of payment. Bank credit thus consists in “new means of 
payment created ad hoc, since the entrepreneurs have no means of their own and since there 
are -so far- no savings”(Schumpeter 1934, p. 107). These means of payment do not only 
include money as such but also different kinds of credit instruments performing the same role 
as moneyxxvii. Schumpeter argues that now “not only a part but the whole of the exchange 
process can be settled by (...) credit media” (Schumpeter 1934, p. 53). 
Third, for Schumpeter, this generalised role of credit cannot but affect the market for loanable 
funds. Like Wicksell, he shows that credit creation by banks together with the institutional 
setting that renders it possible - i.e. an organised banking system producing new sources of 
purchasing power within the economy - disrupts the Walrasian adjustment mechanism of the 
supply and demand for cash balances. In such an environment, it is logically impossible to 
interpret the market for money and credit in the same way as any other market in which 
supply and demand would be represented by independent functions. Indeed, Schumpeter 
writes: 
 
[The] demand for credit makes possible not only itself, but also a corresponding supply; and every supply 
makes possible a corresponding demand, so that supply and demand in this case do not confront each other 
as independent forces. To this extent, therefore, the banks determine not only to whom they will grant credit 
but also how much credit as a whole they wish to grant and what demand to call forth (Schumpeter (1917) 
1956, p. 207). 
 
 
Schumpeter’s adherence to Wicksell is less clear with regard to the definition of interest rates.   
On one side, in spite of his Austrian academic education and in contrast to Hayek and Mises, 
Schumpeter does not take Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of capital as a starting-point of his business 
cycle analysis. He indeed consider that such an conception of the interest rate is inapplicable 
to the understanding of economic development. For him, the real modifications implied by a 
decrease in the natural rate of interest, i.e., in Hayek’s eyes, the access to more roundabout 
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and therefore, more productive methods of production, cannot qualify for the role of an 
explanation of the process of economic developmentxxviii. In other terms, the effect of a 
change in the volume of savings is capable of being currently absorbed within the economic 
system and cannot by itself create the alternation of booms and depressions we observexxix. 
According to Schumpeter, the emergence of interest is to be associated with dynamics, and 
the only factor of change that permits the passage from stationary states (including the case of 
‘steady-growth’) to dynamics is innovation. This is the reason why he argues that the interest 
rate has to be reduced to zero in the state of what he called ‘the circular flow’xxx.  
 
On the other side, he clearly defines the rate of interest as essentially a ‘monetary 
phenomenon’ which owes its existence to the emergence of a positive rate of profit associated 
with innovative productive activity. Such a conception of interest is the consequence of 
Schumpeter’s definition of saving and investment as monetary magnitudes. Indeed, according 
to the author, investment gives rise to an equivalent amount of saving since the latter is 
defined independently from its real source. In his own terms: 
 
 By Saving we mean the earmarking, by an household, of an element of its current receipts –as 
distinguished from “capital gains”– for the acquisition of titles to income or for the payment of debt. If a 
firm does the same thing with an element of its net receipts from the sale of products and services, we shall 
speak of Accumulation. The distinction between Saving and Accumulation also applies, although it may be 
difficult to carry out, in cases in which, as in the case of many farmers, “firm” and “household” are one. We 
confine both concepts to decisions about monetary funds and we neglect, for convenience’s sake, any similar 
decision that may be taken with respect to commodities. Saving and Accumulation will thus be treated as 
elements of a monetary process: the complementary process in the world of goods constitute a distinct 
problem (Schumpeter, 1939, vol. I, p. 75). 
 
 
On the ground of the previous definition of saving, the notion of real rate of interest looses its 
relevance since the interest factor is a purely monetary phenomenon. Schumpeter writes:  
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 Interest –more correctly, the capital sum plus interest– is, to use our turn of phrase, the price paid by 
borrowers for a social permit to acquire commodities and services without having previously fulfilled the 
condition which in the institutional pattern of capitalism is normally set on the issue of such a social permit, 
i.e., without having previously contributed other commodities and services to the social stream (Schumpeter, 
1939, vol. I, p. 123).  
 
Moreover, as the rate of interest is derived directly from the emerging positive rate of profit 
associated with the gains implied by the operation of innovative productive activities, it is 
also a short-term phenomenon. In this prospect, the Wicksellian dichotomy between real and 
monetary rates of interest becomes meaningless. What indeed turns out is that, for 
Schumpeter, the real and the monetary rates are no longer determined independently from 
each other since the magnitude of the real rate derives from the difference between the 
monetary rate of interest and the rate of inflation. This is what suggests the following passage: 
 
 Nominal and real rates in this sense are only different measurements of the same thing or, if we prefer to 
speak of different things even in this case, it is the monetary rate which represents the fundamental 
phenomenon and the real rate which represents the derived phenomenon (Schumpeter, 1939, vol. I, p. 111)  
 
 
By contrast, Schumpeter’s references to Mises are scarcexxxi, which is surprisingly enough 
judging by the fact that they knew each other from Böhm-Bawerk seminars.  
Moreover, Schumpeter’s comments in Business Cycles on the Hayek-Mises’ approach 
exemplify his misinterpretation of Mises’ explanation of the process a re-adjustment between 
the two rates of interestxxxii. 
Indeed, Schumpeter alleges that the flaw in the Hayek-Mises’ theory is that “the motive force 
[for cyclical movements] is entirely supplied by the initiating action of banks” (Schumpeter, 
1939, vol. II, p. 634).  
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But if Schumpeter’s critique is acceptable in view of Hayek’s explanation of the upper turning 
point, it is not the case any more when applied to Mises. Indeed, as we have emphasized, 
Mises does not invoke the behavior of banks, nor the existence of any limit to the creation of 
credit due to the shrinking of banks’ reserves, in his explanation of the reversal of the cycle.  
As suggested by Bellofiore, Schumpeter’s interpretation overlooks the fact that “Mises’ main 
concern is to show that Wicksell’s extreme case of a single bank and of a ‘pure credit system’, 
in which there is no limit to the amount of credit the bank(s) can create, is anything but 
unrealistic; on the contrary, it is representative of the natural working of a modern monetary 
economy” (Bellofiore, 1998, p. 533).  
To contrast his own view with the Hayek-Mises’ one, Schumpeter attempts to prove that both 
the initiative of banks and mechanism of interest rates are, as elements of explanation, 
superfluous since, as we may infer from theoretical considerations, and as we can see 
statistically and historically, primary factors which disrupt the existing state of equilibrium as 
well as those which bring about the upper turning point of the cycle are independent of the 
changes in the rates of interest that have previously occurred. As he puts it: “[i]n this sense, 
we may say that interest no more causes the down turn than it causes the excursion of the 
cycle into prosperity” (Schumpeter, Ibid., p. 636). 
As well-known, Schumpeter attributes the origin of business cycles to discontinuous changes 
due to innovations that disrupt the ‘circular flow’ which was prevailing before. At first sight, 
this position leads the reader to interpret Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development as a 
real approachxxxiii. This however does not mean that Schumpeter neglected the role of the 
banking system within the process of economic development. On the contrary, according to 
him, innovative activities cannot be undertaken without the collaboration of bankers who 
provide ‘entrepreneurs’ with the necessary financial meansxxxiv.  
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Moreover, the influence of banks goes far beyond the mere provision of credit. Schumpeter 
writes: 
 
 Since all reserve funds and savings today usually flow to him [the banker] and the total demand for free 
purchasing power, whether existing or to be created, concentrates on him, he has either replaced private 
capitalists or become their agent ; he has himself become the capitalist par excellence. He stands between 
those who wish to form new combinations and the possessors of productive means (Schumpeter, 1934, 
p. 74). 
 
 
More precisely, in his analysis, banks appear to exert permanent and asymmetric effects upon 
the “money market” which includes both the “sphere of hoards and reserves” and the “sphere 
of capital”xxxv. Moreover, Schumpeter assumes that these two spheres do not work separately 
but interfere within a single “money market”. On the ground of this interdependence, banks 
hence extend their influence to the sphere of income-yielding assets. Schumpeter indeed 
writes: 
 
 The most cursory glance at money market processes shows that the banks regulate both stock market 
speculation and the pulse-beat of industrial and commercial life, now restraining, now stimulating them 
(Schumpeter, 1956, p. 176). 
 
 
Such an assertion indicates that banks exert a very strong control on economic life. In 
particular, they may interact with real propagation mechanisms during the cycle by altering 
the distribution of productive resources within the economy. These reallocation effects may 
thus interfere with price competition and channel productive efforts towards new activities. In 
contrast to Hayek’s analysis, these effects are not transitory. The real modifications following 
credit expansion durably alter instead, through a process of adaptation, the system of values 
prevailing within the economy.  
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Turning to the problem of the limit to credit expansion, Schumpeter’s position may be re-
constructed as follows. First, he suggests the existence of a natural limit to the credit creation 
process. Indeed, since the interest rate on loans is conceived as a ‘tax’ on the yield of 
innovation, declining profits resulting from intensive exploitation of inventions restrain the 
demand for finance. Second, according to their expectations with respect to borrowers’ 
solvency, banks can decide to ration credit and therefore, they become able to control their 
own level of liquidityxxxvi.  
 
Finally, the phenomenon of inflation appears to be of secondary importance in Schumpeter’s 
analysis, so that the issue of the cash drain and the resulting collapse of the monetary system 
is no more relevant. According to Schumpeter, the new sources of purchasing power created 
by banks are indeed oriented towards an individual entrepreneur for a specific productive 
purpose. To put it differently, credit precedes the realization of entrepreneurial gains. In this 
respect, credit inflation may arise, but it can only be temporary, as explained in the following 
passage:  
 
 After completing his business (...) [the entrepreneur] has, if everything has gone according to 
expectations, enriched the social stream with goods whose total price is greater than the credit received and 
than the total price of the goods directly and indirectly used up by him. Hence the equivalence between the 
money and commodity streams is more than restored, the credit inflation more than eliminated, the effect 
upon prices more than compensated for, so that it may be said that there is no credit inflation at all in this 
case –rather deflation– but only a non-synchronous appearance of purchasing power and of the commodities 
corresponding to it, which temporarily produces the semblance of inflation (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 110). 
 
This assertion clearly indicates that the banking system cannot have the detrimental effects 
associated with a cumulative inflationary process that are assumed by Hayek. Far from 
artificially altering the structure of prices, banks allows the modifications of the system of 
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values that are associated with innovation to occur. They thus perform a necessary function 
for economic development, which would not be feasible otherwise. 
 
 
 
Our revival of Hayek and Schumpeter, in the light of their common Wicksellian-Misian 
inheritance has allowed us to underline the similarities between these four authors with 
respect to their treatment of the relation between money defined in a broader sense (i.e., 
including bank-credit) and the working of the market for capital.  
Indeed, both Schumpeter and Hayek, as Wicksell and Mises, consider that credit creation by 
banks alter the conditions under which investment takes place. However, the explanations 
provided by each of them with regard to the influence of  banks in the unfolding of dynamic 
economic processes sharply differ.   
If for Mises and Hayek, the ‘lengthening effect’ plays a crucial role in their respective 
explanations of economic fluctuations, for Wicksell and Schumpeter, this effect is, if ever 
existing, conceived as being of minor importance. 
Now, as we have developed, Mises’ Theory of Money and Credit contains the foundations for 
a conception of the dynamics of capital accumulation whereby the modifications in the 
distribution of income and wealth implied by the creation of new means of payments by 
banks could be consistent with real growthxxxvii. This view is supported by the fact that Mises 
considers that the banking system as a whole encounters no technical limits to the circulation 
of fiduciary media, provided all banks issue fiduciary media according to uniform principles. 
Therefore, if they are not constrained by some sort of deliberate intervention by monetary 
authorities, banks may durably affect the distribution of economic resources in such an extent 
as to increase the amount of means of subsistence within the economy. As we have shown, 
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such a conception is in accordance with Schumpeter’s view of the way a monetary works in 
the presence of a developed banking system. 
Finally, both Hayek and Wicksell focus on the limits of credit creation that a banking system 
is likely to encounter over the cycle as a determining force of business fluctuations. By 
contrast, as we have seen, Mises emphasizes the fundamental role played by the indirect 
monetary influences through the variations in the objective exchange value of money and 
deliberately excludes all kinds of institutional constraints to credit creation by banks from his 
analysis of the cycle. As far as Schumpeter’s description is concerned, focus is put on the real 
forces (imitation, competition, liquidation, etc.) emanating from the process of adaptation to 
technological innovation.  
 
Now, if we concentrate on Hayek and Schumpeter’s theories of business cycles, the 
aforementioned differences may be reflected on in the light of their respective views of 
economic dynamics and its implications in terms of monetary policy. 
  
 
 
V 
Hayek and Schumpeter’s views of the dynamics of monetary economies and their corresponding policy 
prescription : two distinct views of how credit shapes the economy 
 
 
 IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION WE HAVE CONCENTRATED on the common Wicksellian-Misian 
origin of Hayek and Schumpeter’s conceptions of money and banking and focused on their 
respective views concerning the influence of the banking system on the working of the market 
for capital. 
  29 
We have then emphasized that the two Austrian authors contrast markedly as regards their 
description of the mechanisms that constitute economic dynamics.  
The oppositions between Hayek and Schumpeter’s theories of business cycles should be 
reconsidered in the light of the debates that took place in the 20s and 30s’ among German 
speaking economistsxxxviii. The conflicting issue of whether or not equilibrium theory could 
account for the observed fluctuations of main macroeconomic magnitudes has constituted one 
of the main concern of those discussions. The following quotation from Schumpeter gives an 
account of this conflict: 
 
 There is the ‘theory’ that the economic process is essentially non-oscillatory and that the explanation of 
cyclical as well as other fluctuations must be therefore be sought in the particular circumstances (...) which 
disturb that even flow (...) And there is the ‘theory’ that the economic process itself is essentially wave-like 
–that cycles are the form of capitalist evolution (Schumpeter, 1952, p. 252). 
 
These two confronting views of economic processes might serve as a convenient starting 
point for contrasting Hayek and Schumpeter’s respective approaches of business cycles. 
On one side, Hayek indeed insists on the necessity “to build on the foundations given by the 
concept of a tendency towards an equilibrium [because] it is this concept alone which permits 
us to explain fundamental phenomena like the determination of prices or incomes, an 
understanding of which is essential to any explanation of fluctuation of production” (Hayek, 
1935, p. 34).  
On the other side, Schumpeter regards business cycles as the major manifestation of economic 
dynamics and considers that equilibrium theory is not qualified for providing any satisfactory 
explanation of economic fluctuations. In the Preface of Business cycles, he wrote: 
 
 Analysing business cycles means neither more nor less than analysing the economic process of the 
capitalist era (...) Cycles are not, like, tonsils, separable things that might be treated by themselves, but are, 
like the beat of the heart, of the essence of the organism that display them (Schumpeter, 1939, vol. I, p. v). 
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Upon closer investigation, things are far more complicate. On one hand, Hayek’s main 
concern is to investigate empirical questions such as the existence of business cycles which, 
according to him, need a theoretical explanation. Necretheless, he considers as part of the task 
of a theoretician “to determine how the fact of cyclical oscillations in economic activity can 
be reconciled with the general theory of equilibrium, or how that theory can be reconciled 
with facts” (Hayek, 1935, p. 34). In other terms, it seems that we are justified in contending 
that, far from being fully satisfied with the usual general theory of equilibrium, Hayek always 
tried to extend its boundaries so as to make it apt to account for disequilibrium economic 
situations. Plausibly, what Hayek undermined is that, to be consistent, such a endeavor 
implied more drastic modifications of the usual economic analytical tools as he thought 
beforehandxxxix.  
On the other hand, Schumpeter took a more radical way, consisting in denying the possibility 
to reconcile the equilibrium approach with any explanation of dynamic phenomena such as 
business cycles. Dynamics is therefore conceived as a separate side of economic theorizing 
that not only deals with distinct matters but also with different methods and tools that have to 
be forged for that purposexl. However, as stressed by Perroux, Schumpeter’s theory of 
development also entails an inner tension which derives from the methodological dilemma 
due to the relationship between abstract logic analysis and the historical and sociological 
approachxli. Schumpeter’s description of the succession of waves of innovation is a striking 
example of this tensionxlii. 
These differences between Hayek and Schumpeter are important not only for identifying their 
respective vision of economic dynamics but also for interpreting their corresponding policy 
prescriptions.  
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In the field of monetary policy, both Hayek and Schumpeter agree that price-stabilization 
policies are not to be prescribed because they perturb the free play of prices and its essential 
function of signaling modifications in scarcity conditions as well as providing the necessary 
set of information on which agents rely when making economic decisionsxliii. In particular, 
they both contend that when technical progress raises productivity, the level of price should 
fall while total money incomes remain unchangedxliv. However, there are important 
differences in their respective argumentations.  
In Schumpeter’s ‘pure model’, the cyclical dynamics brings about recurrent expansions and 
contractions of credit-money supply. Therefore, Schumpeter is favorable to some elasticity of 
credit over the cycle so that the price level would rise in the upswing and fall in the 
downswing.  
By contrast, Hayek’s prescription is to eliminate such cyclical fluctuations. Consequently, he 
rules out all kinds of external intervention that would allows the quantity of money to vary. 
Indeed, in his 1928 article on intertemporal equilibrium, he criticized the gold exchange 
because it allows the stock of gold to vary. Likewise, he was not favorable to free banking 
because it necessarily implies some elasticity of the supply of bank-issued money.  
However, there is a puzzle in the development of Hayek’s view with regard to monetary 
policy considerations. Indeed, his claim for a monetary system in which any change in the 
quantity of money should be held constant, which is exemplified in his 1928 article, has been 
amended several times until it is has been completely dismissed in his last work, The 
Denationalization of Money (Hayek, 1978)xlv. 
In this respect, it is interesting to note that during the formation period Hayek’s view on the 
cycle was not so dissimilar from that of Schumpeter to the extent that he consented to some 
benefits of forced saving. In 1925, he wrote: 
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There can be no doubt at all that the development of the capitalistic economy over the last 100 years 
would not have been possible without the ‘forced saving’ effected by the extension of additional bank credit. 
Hence economic fluctuations must probably regarded as necessary accompaniment of the accelerated 
development experienced by countries of the Western world in the last 150 years. Such fluctuations, in turn 
could be entirely eliminated only if the tempo of this development was substantially lessened...(Hayek, 
1984, p. 103). 
 
 
This position should have lead him to make some concessions with respect to his later radical 
claim. Indeed, as already mentioned, in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, he seems to 
believe in a flexible credit multiplier so that he should have admitted that this mechanism 
would be as effective in the case of ‘forced saving’ as in the case of ‘voluntary saving’. But as 
we know, by the time he wrote Prices and Production, Hayek switched to a more restrictive 
explanation of  business cycles, seeing in the deliberate decision-making by monetary 
authorities the ultimate cause of fluctuations, implying that this harmful influence should be 
avoided. However, in the same book, he acknowledges that there were one “exception to the 
general rule that, in order that money should remain neutral towards prices, the amount of 
money payments or the amount of money payments should invariable” (Hayek, 1935, p. 123). 
This improvement appeared as he went to consider the changes in the velocity of money 
circulation which he had previously ignored. This lead him to revise his monetary policy 
norm accordingly, now stating that it was the “total money stream” (Hayek, 1935, p. 131), i.e.  
the quantity of money times its velocity of circulation, that should remain constant.  
 
As is obvious now, Hayek and Schumpeter were critical of the price stabilization proposal yet 
for different reasons. Clearly, Hayek attacks this prescription from the following angle : a 
stable instead of a falling trend of the price level in a growing economy causes an artificial 
increase of the total money stream, leading to an inevitable crisisxlvi. For Schumpeter, a policy 
which stabilizes prices inhibits economic development by preventing the process of credit 
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creation by banks to have its full effects, i.e. to provide the innovators with the required 
means of payment in order to implement their productive activity.  
 
From a different sight, Hayek and Schumpeter shared the view that national price stabilization 
policies conflicted with the international prevailing system of the gold standard.  
Although both Hayek and Schumpeter did not considered the gold standard as an ideal system 
in theory, they nevertheless esteemed the fact that it was designed to work automatically, i.e., 
without the interference of  the political sphere.  
In 1927, Schumpeter wrote that “even if gold (...) surrenders the monetary system to the 
arbitrariness of gold production, it prevents other and more harmful arbitrary action” 
(Schumpeter, 1927, p. 161)xlvii. 
In 1937, Hayek’s stance at the gold standard has moved from his early position. As suggested 
by White (1999), this was due to his switch from the ‘constant money stock’ to the ‘constant 
money stream’ norm in Prices and Productionxlviii. This theoretical improvement altered his 
critique of the gold standard. While in 1928, dissenting from Mises’ view, he rejected it 
entirely on the grounds that it allows the quantity of gold to vary, in Prices and Production, 
when warning that an attempt “drastically to reconstruct our monetary system, in particular to 
replace the semi-automatic gold standard by a more or less arbitrarily managed currency” 
poses dangers “much greater than the harm which is possibly done by the gold standard” 
(Hayek, 1935, p. 127), his position is akin to the one of his teacherxlix. In the same vein, in 
Monetary Nationalism and International Stability, similarly to Schumpeter, he indicates that 
they are merits in “any mechanical principle (such as the gold standard)” which at least has an 
equilibrating mechanisms for distributing the global money stock among countries (Hayek, 
1937, p. 93). 
 34
Finally, the arguments developed in The Denationalization of money lead Hayek to move 
again his position with respect to the gold standard. He now favors free banking and predicts 
that in a free competition among different types of money, the public would choose stable-
valued private fiat-money over goldl.  
 
 
 
VI 
Conclusion 
 
 THE RE-EXAMINATION OF HAYEK AND SCHUMPETER’S theories of banking and business 
cycles clearly confirms the existence of a Wicksellian connection. This result is not 
surprising. It is indeed now commonplace to recognize the widespread influence of the 
Swedish tradition within the debates about macroeconomic issues that marked the 20s and the 
30s. Following this line, it should be reminded that both Hayek and Schumpeter were also 
great historians of economic thought and that they strongly participated to the diffusion of 
Wicksell’s ideas among the English speaking readers. Mises also greatly contributed to 
establish this connection among the Austrians. His major work, the Theory of Money and 
Credit, though often undermined, clearly paved the way for the development of a business 
cycle approach tying together Wicksell’s analysis of credit and the Austrian theory of capital.  
Furthermore, from what we have seen, the Mises’ synthesis has inspired two distinct 
explanations of the role played by credit and the banking system within the working of the 
economy. Our interpretation is that Mises’ work already indicated the two possible extensions 
that were respectively privileged by Hayek and Schumpeter. Hayek took one of the direction 
which consisted in concentrating on the real capital requirements for the economic production 
structures to be maintained in equilibrium through time and therefore regarded credit and the 
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organization of the banking system as harmful factors. Schumpeter favoured the other way 
which relied on the ‘ultra Wicksellian’ idea of a ‘pure credit economy’ and thus conceived 
credit and its associated effects on income distribution and resources allocation as a necessary 
lubricant for growth. 
Finally, although Hayek and Schumpeter find common ground in their monetary policy 
prescriptions, we should not be surprised that, in view of their quite distinct visions of 
dynamic economic processes, they parted company on the arguments against price-
stabilization policies. 
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i. See Hong’s article on Schumpeter vs. Hayek’s theory of capital and their respective vision of economic 
dynamics. See also Klaussinger’s paper on Schumpeter and Hayek’s respective views of the Great Depression. 
ii. This connection is usually undermined in the literature. See, for instance, David Laidler’s survey on the 
Austrians and the Stockholm School, where Mises contribution to the development of Austrian business theory 
is not given due account (Laidler, 1991, p. 298). As suggested by Bellofiore (1998), one of the reasons of the 
relative lack of receptivity of Theory of Money and Credit could be that Mises never replied to Wicksell’s review 
of the first edition of the book in the Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung in 1914. We 
are grateful to Bellofiore for indicating that the English translation of this review is now available in Bien-
Greaves and McGee (1993). See Bellofiore (1998), p. 570, note 50. 
iii. The same point is also sometimes made in relation to the Robertson-Keynes Cambridge-based approach of 
the late 20s and early 30s. We shall not consider this connection here since it is beyond the scope of this paper.  
iv. Mises defines the objective exchange value of money as follows: “[b]y ‘the objective exchange value of 
money’ we are accordingly to understand the possibility of obtaining a certain quantity of other economic goods 
in exchange for a given quantity of money” (Mises, 1980, p. 122).  
v. Even if Mises does not considered himself as an adherent of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of interest, he regards it 
as a satisfactory solution of the problem. In particular, he recognizes that Böhm-Bawerk was the first to clear the 
way that leads to understanding of the problem; he was the first to make it possible systematically to relate the 
problem of interest to that of the value of money (Mises, 1980, footnote p. 378). 
vi. On this point, Mises adopts Menger’s classification of goods according to which goods are evaluated in 
relation to their relative distance from final goods. Present goods are consumption goods, or goods of first-order, 
the value of which depends on the expected utility from consumption. Goods of higher-orders comprise the set 
of heterogeneous intermediate goods that are gradually incorporated within the process of production. Their 
respective value is determined by a process of imputation back to the lower order goods, in accordance with the 
marginal contribution they make to the production of final goods. 
vii. The issue of ‘fiduciary media’ corresponds to the creation by banks of money substitutes that are not covered 
by an equivalent and simultaneous quantity of goods or money proper. Mises indeed distinguishes between 
money in the broader sense and money in the narrower sense. The latter corresponds to money proper in the 
usual sense (including fiat money), while the former comprises also money substitutes These substitutes are 
either money certificates or fiduciary media depending on whether or not they are wholly covered by money in 
the narrower sense and serve the same purpose as money proper since they are convertible and secure claims to 
payments. They then add to the total quantity of money in circulation (Mises, 1980, p. 155). In the following, 
interest is focused on fiduciary media, that is banknotes and current accounts which are not wholly covered by 
money in the narrower sense. This distinction echoes the opposition made by Mises between the commodity 
credit and the circulation credit. The former corresponds to “those credit transactions which are characterized by 
the fact that they impose a sacrifice on that party who performs his part of the bargain before the other does-the 
foregoing of immediate power of disposal over the exchanged good, or, if this version is preferred, the foregoing 
of immediate power of disposal over the surrendered good until the receipt of that for which it is exchanged” 
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(Ibid. p. 297). By contrast, the second kind of credit transaction is “characterized by the fact that in them the gain 
of the party who receives before he pays is balanced by no sacrifice on the part of the other party” (Ibid.). 
Obviously it is with this second sort of banking business alone that Mises is concerned. It is worth pointing out 
here that this distinction is very similar, as we shall see, to Schumpeter’s opposition between normal credit and 
abnormal credit.  
viii. In fact, the effect on the rate of interest is as permanent as the fluctuations in the objective exchange value of 
money (Mises, 1980, p. 384). 
ix. Mises (1980), p. 400. 
x. For Mises, the business of banking falls into two distinct branches. The first one is restricted to the 
“negotiation of credit through the loan of other people’s money while the second is characterized by the granting 
of credit through the issue of fiduciary media (...)” (Mises, 1980, p. 293). For him, provided all banks act 
according uniform principles, the circulation of fiduciary media meets no other natural limit than the banks’ 
running costs, which are extremely low. Thus, if there is no artificial restriction of the credit system, i.e., if there 
is no some sort of deliberate human intervention, the activity of issuing fiduciary is almost infinitely elastic (Ibid. 
p. 346). 
xi. This is one of the point on which Wicksell replied to Mises’ first edition of the Theory of Money and Credit  
in his 1914 review. The argument is found in Uhr (1960, p. 257). What Wicksell objects to Mises is the fact that 
the real rate of interest would be reduced to the level of the loan rate by real capital formation resulting from 
“forced saving” (Mises, 1934, pp. 355-365). For Wicksell, the entrepreneurs are not forced to lengthen the period 
of production because, if we assume that entrepreneurs used an optimal production period before the loan rate 
became low, then they will continue to produce for a while with the same length production period. Meanwhile 
they merely pocket their gain by being able to obtain credit at less expense than they had counted on. This gain 
induces them to extend their operations in the next period, in the sense of  “widening” the capital structure. This 
attempt at widening forces them to bud up wages in competition with one another. Now, if prices remained 
constant, the increase in wages would reduce the real rate and would induce entrepreneurs to offset this tendency 
by lengthening the period in the sense of  “deepening” or increasing its vertical dimension. But prices do not 
remain constant. Instead they rise, because real capital –the subsistence fund– has not increased appreciably in so 
short a time. In fact the subsistence fund may have decreased since the loan rate, as an inducement to saving, has 
been reduced. On the other hand, money wages and rents have risen. Thus, as prices rise, entrepreneurs are again 
in a position to continue making gains, despite higher wages and rents. Consequently, they are not forced to 
extend the capital structure in the vertical dimension, and thus the real rate does not fall” (Wicksell, 1914, p. 
147).  
In 1915 however, faced with objections by Davidson and  Mises, Wicksell when the second Swedish edition of 
Lectures-II was published, made concession toward his critics concerning the mutual influence of the money rate 
and the natural rate: 
 
The objection has been raised to the whole of the above reasoning, that a lowering of the loan rate must 
also depress the real rate so that the difference between them is more and more leveled out and thus the 
stimulus to a continued rise in prices eliminated. This possibility cannot be entirely rejected. Ceteris Paribus 
a lowering of the real rate unconditionally demands new real capital, i.e., increased saving. But this would 
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certainly occur, even if involuntarily, owing to the fact that higher prices would compel a restriction of 
consumption on the part of those who had fixed money incomes (...) (Wicksell, Lectures-II, pp. 198-199).      
 
 
xii. This need not to be the case. It is worth mentioning here that, in contrast to Hayek (1966, 1935), Mises does 
not make this assumption. 
xiii. Hayek gives a similar account of the movement of relative prices during the cycle. As stressed by Hicks 
(1967), some delay (of consumption relative to wages, or in the wage rise) must be supposed for the Hayek story 
to make sense. As for Mises, see Ellis (1934, p. 336) and Bellofiore (1998, note 53), who support Mises claim, 
i.e., a delay in wages. However, though this assumption is central for the unfolding of the cycle, it must not be 
taken for granted, given that the financing of increased activity involves an increase in wages and therefore, a 
corresponding increase in demand for consumption goods. See Bellofiore (1998, note 34).  
xiv. Insofar as they experience rising wages, they would rather increase their demand for consumption goods. 
xv. This reinforcing effect on the rate of interest on capital results from transitory movements in the objective 
exchange value of money that are linked to the fact that “variations in the exchange value of money do not 
appear everywhere simultaneously and uniformly, but start from a particular point and only spread out gradually 
throughout the market” (Mises, 1980, p. 387). More precisely, Mises writes that it is the entrepreneurs who 
generally benefit from the increase of the issue of fiduciary media. Indeed, if the objective exchange value falls, 
the entrepreneur gains in the short run since “he will be able to meet part of his expenses of production at prices 
that do not correspond to the higher level, while, on the other hand, he will be able to dispose of his product at a 
price that is in accordance with the variation that has meanwhile occurred” (Ibid.). This circumstance cannot fail 
to have an effect on the interest rate on loans. Indeed, those entrepreneurs who benefit from inflation, i.e., those 
that are up the scale of goods, are prepared if necessary to pay a higher rate of interest, and the competition of 
other would-be-borrowers, who are attracted by the same prospects of profits, will accept the higher rate. Thus, 
as long as this process going on and as differential profits (or losses) occur, there is a tendency for the interest 
rate to increase (or to decrease) depending on whether the objective exchange value of money falls (or rises) 
Ibid.).  
xvi. Mises believes that a precise re-establishment of the old price ratio between goods of the first order and 
goods of higher orders is not possible. On one hand, the intervention of banks has brought about a redistribution 
of income and property. On the other hand, the automatic recovery of the loan market involves certain of the 
phenomena of a crisis (a certain degree of irreversibility, social losses of value, etc.), which are the signs of the 
loss of some of the capital invested in the excessively lengthened roundabout processes of production. According 
to Mises, the remaining trace of all these disturbances will be a general increase of the objective exchange value 
of money (Mises, 1980, p. 402). 
xvii. As emphasized by Bellofiore (1998), in times of hyperinflation, things are even worse since, contrary to the 
usual assumption by Mises of static expectations, now, expectations do not only reflect previous inflation rate 
but anticipate the future state of the market (Mises, 1923, pp. 8-9). This circumstance leads to an even more 
drastic fall in the objective exchange value of money. In this case, prices rises at a greater rate than the growth of 
money and the loan rate of interest can then rise without bounds (Mises, 1980, p. 402). For more details, see 
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Bellofiore (1998, p. 568, note 44).     
xviii. If the purchasing power of the commodity money is too low it discourages the production of the 
commodity which serves as money, but increases, ceteris paribus, its industrial consumption, and the deficiency 
which would arise as soon as consumption began to exceed production has to be made up from the bank 
reserves. 
xix. As suggested by Bellofiore, this characteristic, i.e. Mises’ reference only to fiat paper money in his theory of 
the cycle,  has been overlooked by the secondary literature (Bellofiore,1998, p. 570, note 49). See also Moss 
(1976, pp. 36-37).  
xx. In this respect, Hayek’s reading of Wicksell is worth pointing out. For Hayek, Wicksell’s success in his 
attempt to link money and capital accumulation is essentially due to “the fact that his attempt was based on a 
modern and highly developed theory of interest, that of Böhm-Bawerk” (Hayek, 1933, p. 20). However, he adds: 
 
 But by a curious irony of fate, Wicksell has become famous, not for his real improvements on the old 
doctrine, but for the one point in his exposition in which he definitely erred: namely, for his attempt to 
establish a rigid connection between the rate of interest and the changes in the general price level (Ibid.). 
 
 
xxi. On this point, Hayek pays a true tribute to Mises. He indeed acknowledges that Mises “has succeeded in 
transforming the Wicksellian theory into an explanation of the credit cycle which is logically satisfactory” 
(Hayek, 1966, p. 22). 
xxii. In his 1932 review of Prices and Production, Sraffa  points out that what one would have expect from 
Hayek is that he would have provided a comparison between what he refers as ‘neutral money’, which comes to 
the same as a state in which there is no money at all, and other monetary systems. He writes: 
 
 We therefore might expect that Dr. Hayek would, in discussing a number of assumed cases in which 
equilibrium is disturbed, compare the results in a moneyless economy with the corresponding results 
obtained under various monetary systems, or policies. This would bring out which are the essential 
characteristics common to every kind of money, as well as their differences, thus supplying the elements for 
the estimate of the merits of alternative policies (Sraffa, p. 1995, p. 199). 
 
 
xxiii. See A. H. Hansen and H. Tout (1933), pp. 133-135 and  M. Colonna (1994), pp. 41-44. 
xxiv. See T-M Trautwein (1994), p. 77 and T-M Trautwein (1996), pp. 45-46. 
In his review of Prices and Production, Sraffa makes a similar statement. He criticizes Hayek’s distinction 
between the cases of ‘voluntary savings’ and ‘forced savings’, stating that there is no reason for the latter to be 
less stable than the former. He argues that the crisis resulting from “the attempt of  agents to expand 
consumption to the usual proportion” is not likely to occur since: 
 
  
[O]ne class [the producers] has, for a time, robbed another class [the consumers] of a part of their 
incomes; and saved the plunder. When the robbery comes to an end, it is clear that the victims cannot 
possibly consume the capital which is now well out of their reach. If they are wage-earners, who have all the 
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time consumed every penny of their income, they have no wherewithal to expand consumption. And if they 
are capitalists, who have not shared in the plunder, they may indeed be induced to consume now a part of 
their capital by the fall in the rate of interest; but not more so than if the rate had been lowered by the 
‘voluntary savings’ of other people (Sraffa [1932], 1995, p. 203-204). 
 
 
See also A. H. Hansen and H. Tout (1933), pp. 139-140 and H. Neisser (1934), pp. 436-439.  
xxv. In his History of Economic Analysis, Schumpeter ranks Wicksell’s contribution –together with the ones of 
Walras, Marshall and the Austrians (Menger, Wieser, Mises) –among the great performances in this field during 
the period 1870-1914 and later, even he adds with some irony that “posthumously he acquired even greater 
international reputation as monetary theorist than either Marshall or Walras (...) due to the facts that his Swedish 
disciples never ceased to call themselves Wicksellians, even if they criticized and surpassed him, and that his 
message became accessible in German at a relatively early date and in a form that was not so forbidding as was 
that of Walras” (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1085).  
Note also that Schumpeter paid a specific tribute to Wicksell in a German article entirely dedicated to the works 
of the Swedish authors (Schumpeter, 1927a, pp. 238-251) .  
xxvi. More specifically, Schumpeter describes Wicksell’s achievement in his famous model of the Cumulative 
Process as the combination of two facts that had become the concern of more and more economists, i.e. 1) “that 
there is no such thing as a quantitatively definite need for loans or discounts and that the actual amount of 
borrowers’ demand is as much a question of the banks’ propensity to lend and of the rates they charge as it is a 
question of borrowers’ demand for credit” ; 2) “that the practice of financing nothing but current trade –
discounting good commercial paper– does not guarantee stability of prices or of business situations in general or, 
in depression, the liquidity of banks” (Schumpeter, 1954, pp. 1112-1113).   
xxvii. Schumpeter lists them as “commodities which in fact circulate as money”, “money made of a material the 
market price of which is less than the purchasing power of the monetary unit made of it”, “bank notes” but also 
“current accounts and clearing accounts”, “the amount of all payments which are disbursements out of income 
and are handled exclusively by compensation” and, finally, “credit instruments and claim titles of all kinds, to 
the extent that they in fact perform the role of money” (Schumpeter, (1917) 1956, p. 207). 
xxviii. For Schumpeter, the ‘lengthening effect’, referred by him as the “Hayek effect” which he defines as “the 
effect on investment of a rate of interest lower than would have obtained had the process been left to itself” 
(Schumpeter, 1939, vol. II, p. 812), is a mechanism of secondary importance. According to him, the 
preoccupation with the vertical composition of capital, fails to account for the transfer of resources that 
characterizes ‘the process by which the effects of the entrepreneurial activity spread (...) over the whole system, 
dislocating values, disrupting the equilibrium that existed before.’ (Schumpeter,1939, vol. I, p. 132). Since his 
main concern is about the process of diffusion of novelty within the whole economy, he prefers an even more 
disaggregated approach to the analysis of economic processes, which also allows to deal with the sectoral 
(horizontal) investment shifts which constitute an essential characteristic of the mechanisms of technological 
diffusion.  
xxix. Schumpeter (1934), p. 68 and Schumpeter (1939), vol. I, p. 78. 
xxx. Controversial as it is, the question of whether this assertion is plausible or not is not relevant to us in this 
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paper. Furthermore, as suggested by Samuelson (1943) Schumpeter’s conception of the circular flow could be 
saved by interpreting that Schumpeter holds the less extreme version that there would exist a positive rate of 
interest in the stationary economy. Indeed, in the case referred by Schumpeter as ‘steady-growth’ and which is to 
be interpreted as a mere extension of the static case of the circular flow, both the rate of interest and saving can 
display positive values. Nevertheless, this case does not belong to the field of dynamics as defined by 
Schumpeter, since it deals with changes that can be accommodated in a routine way. What is actually observed is 
“an increase in the more durable elements, let us call them machinery, such as will exactly equal the additional 
saving offered both in value and cost, which is what we mean by saving creating its own demand (...). The result 
would, in fact, be a steady growth of the system’s industrial outfit by the steady addition to it of new units of 
plants and machinery, which, however, must be of the same types as those which are already in use or would be 
in use but for lumpiness, in order to exclude a new and different element which would otherwise intrude” 
(Schumpeter, 1939, vol. I, p. 80)  
xxxi. In Business Cycles, Schumpeter describes Mises’ analysis of the cycle as an extension of Wicksell initial 
framework of the consequences of a divergence between the real and the monetary rates of interest.  He indeed 
writes: 
 
Suppose that banks emerge from a period of recovery or quiescence in a liquid state. Their interest will 
prompt them to expand their loans by lowering their rates until these are below the Wicksellian real rate, 
which, as we know, is Böhm-Bawerk’s real rate. In consequence, firms will invest –especially in durable 
equipment with respect to which rate of interest counts heavily– beyond the point at which they would have 
to stop with the higher money rate that is equal to the real rate. Thus, on the one hand, the time structure of 
production is distorted. This process can not go on indefinitely, however –there are several possible reasons 
for this, the simplest being that banks run up against the limits set to their lending by their reserves– and 
when it stops and the money rate catches up with the real rate, we have an untenable situation in which the 
investment undertaken on the stimulus of an ‘artificially’ low rate proves a source of losses: booms end in 
liquidation that spell depression (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1120). 
 
 
xxxii. See Bellofiore (1998), p. 533.   
xxxiii. In this respect, Schumpeter’s position as regards the origin of disequilibrium is similar to the one of 
Wicksell. As we know, the cumulative process, although being a far less sophisticated kind of dynamics, starts 
by a real productivity shock which create a divergence between the monetary and the natural rates of interest. 
xxxiv. It is interesting to note that Hayek considers this aspect of Schumpeter’s analysis as a drawback. Let us 
remind how Hayek characterizes it: 
 
 This group [of theories] pays close attention to the monetary inter-connections and expressly emphasizes 
them as a necessary condition for the occurrence of the processes described. But they fail to pass from this 
realisation to the necessary conclusion; to make it a starting-point for their theoretical elaboration, from 
which all other particular phenomena have to be deduced. To this group belongs the theory of Professor 
J. Schumpeter... (Hayek, 1966, p. 97). 
 
 
xxxv. The ‘sphere of capital’ consists of income-yielding assets. It includes the real estate and mortgage markets 
as well as the stock market (Schumpeter, [1917], 1956), p. 176. 
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The common characteristic of these spheres and therefore the distinctive feature of the money market as 
compared to the narrower ‘credit market’ is related to the fact that they permit the working of stock markets. In 
this framework, it is then clear that the role of banks is not limited to the control of credit. As we have 
emphasized, credit creation by banks allows the emergence of a positive rate of interest which stimulates 
savings. Therefore, the “sphere of hoards and reserves” is strongly dependent on banks since the latter modify, 
through their activity of granting credit, the volume of available liquidity.  
 
 
xxxvi. Several passages of Schumpeter suggest this view. In his Theory of Economic Development, he writes: 
 
 We know already by what forces this supply is regulated: first with regard to possible failures by 
entrepreneurs, and secondly with regard to the possible depreciation of the credit means of payment 
(Schumpeter, 1934, p. 195). 
 
 
In Business Cycles, he also indicates that: 
 
 The banker must not only know what the transaction in which he is asked to finance and how it is likely 
to turn out, but he must also know the customer, his business, and even his private habits, and get, by 
frequently ‘talking things over him’, a clear picture of the situation (Schumpeter, 1939, vol. I, pp. 116-117). 
 
 
Upon closer investigation, one may find several arguments in Schumpeter’s writings which indicates that, even 
in a monetary system where banking operations are constrained by reserve requirements, the issue of the 
technical limit to the supply of credit is of little relevance. On one hand, Schumpeter suggests that the deposit 
multiplier would vary in a procyclical manner in accordance with real profit opportunities (see Schumpeter 
(1956), pp. 206-208 – Schumpeter (1934), pp. 112-115 – Schumpeter (1939), vol. I, pp. 121-123). But, in 
contrast to Hayek’s explanation, the cash/deposit ratio would meet no other limits than those related to the shifts 
of demand for credit in the course of the cycle. Indeed, modifications in the demand for finance would affect not 
only the actual credit which is lent out but also the potential credit (i.e. the maximum credit banks can create in a 
given institutional context), so that the limit of credit expansion would also vary with the cycle (See Bellofiore 
(1991), p. 78). 
xxxvii. Note that in Banking Policy and the Price Level, Robertson also emphasizes the indirect and durable 
influence, through redistributive effects altering economic agents’ attitude towards savings, of credit creation by 
banks on the process of capital accumulation. 
xxxviii. See Rühl (1994). 
xxxix. What Hayek refers as the ‘general theory of equilibrium’ should not be confused with the Walraso-
Paretian framework we have usually in mind. A closer look at Hayek’s 1928 article suggests a quite different 
view, where the process of price formation and its convergence to equilibrium follows a much more complex 
procedure than the one assumed in the Arrow-Debreu model of intertemporal equilibrium. In particular, and in 
contrast to the latter view, the Hayekian notion of intertemporal equilibrium allows the possibility of changes in 
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‘fundamentals’ in the individuals’ sets of future decisions. See R. Arena (1999), p. 5. 
xl. Schumpeter (1908), p. 182. 
xli. See Perroux (1965), p. 189. 
xlii. This point has been emphasized by Kuznets in 1940. The authors indeed wonder why, given the existence of 
an infinite supply of possible innovations (including inventions and other combinations), the entrepreneurial 
genius should systematically postpone the pace of the next pioneer until the previous pace have been imitated 
and spread out to such an extent that the upsetting of equilibrium should stop even himself in his pace (Kuznets, 
1940, p. 262). 
44. It should be specified here that comparing ‘on the same dimension’ Hayek and Schumpeter with respect to 
their monetary policy views raises some difficulty. Indeed, Hayek has always been preoccupied by monetary 
policy. As reported by White, in the new preface to the English translation of Monetary Theory and the Trade 
Cycle, Hayek notes that “the critique of the programme of the ‘stabilizers’, which is in many ways the central 
theme of this book, has now occupied me for many years” (Hayek, 1933, pp. 16-17). See White (1999), p. 110. 
The same kind of statement cannot be made for Schumpeter. If he accepted the need for this, and had himself 
been a Minister of Finance in Austria, he nevertheless drew a very sharp line between ‘scientific’ work which he 
considered as a priority and economic policy making.  
45. The last condition, i.e., unchanged total money incomes, is only verified in Schumpeter’s ‘pure model’. 
Indeed, at the stage of ‘secondary approximations’, i.e. when growth factors such as saving, which have been 
assumed away within the framework of the pure model, are now introduced into the analysis, money incomes 
will display a long-term tendency to increase. See Date (1991), pp. 333-334.      
46. Note that  Hayek’s critical argumentation against price stabilization was not only an abstract theoretical 
issue. He strongly believed that this policy had inspired the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve 
System between 1925 and 1929 in a harmful futile joint effort at monetary expansion to prevent the fall in prices 
that should have accompanied the outflow of Gold from Britain and the rapid growth of real output in the U.S. 
economy. See White (1999), p. 110. 
47. The arguments is borrowed from Klaussinger (1995), as translated by him from Schumpeter (1927b).  
48. The argument runs as follows. Having moved toward the ‘constant money stream’ norm, Hayek now regards 
the gold’s supply elasticity as a virtue rather than a vice (Hayek, 1948, pp. 210-211), providing that the gold 
stock responds to money demand shifts with an adequate speed and that there exists a “central monetary 
authority for the whole world” or its equivalent in policy cooperation among national banks (Hayek, 1937, p. 
93). See White (1999), p. 114.  
49. In his Theory of Money and Credit, Mises makes a similar statement:  
 
 The significance of adherence to a metallic-money system lies in the freedom of the value of  money from 
state influence that such a system guarantees. Beyond doubt, considerable disadvantages are involved (...). But 
(...) such a [system] would still deserve preference over one subject to state intervention, since the latter sort of 
money would be subjected to still greater fluctuations. (Mises, 1980, p. 270). 
 
 
50.  It should be recalled here that in The Denationalization of Money, Hayek abandons his earlier position. He 
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now argues for the coordinating properties of price-stabilization policies, underlining that, by minimizing 
forecasting errors, they ensure better reliability of economic agents’ long-term contractual decisions, and 
advocates free banking. See Hayek (1978), pp. 64-70.  
However, this new prescription now conflicted with the problem of the non-neutral injections of bank-credit 
which were at the core of his business cycle theory. Hence, in a striking about-face, he dismissed his previous 
work, as the following passage exemplifies: 
 
 [E]ven those additions to the quantity of money that in a growing economy are necessary to secure a 
stable price level may cause an excess of investment over saving. But though I was among those who early 
pointed out this difficulty, I am inclined to believe that it is a problem of minor importance (Hayek, 1978, 
p. 3).  
 
 
51. See White (1999), p. 117.  
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